

Aitana Guia


Globalisation of borders:

International migration in the Twenty-First century

The goal of this article is to analyse migration from a global perspective in the new political, economic, social, and cultural context that emerged at the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the start of the First Gulf War in 1990, and has taken clearer shape following the September 11, 2001 attack on New York. I will examine the cumulative effects that changes to migration policy and the concept of citizenship have had on immigrants and their countries of origin and reception, and weigh possibilities for future trends. Since the reflections I put forward are provisional in nature, I will describe them by way of short hypotheses corresponding to the various sections of the article.

A LARGE-SCALE MIGRATION PHASE

The world has entered a phase of large-scale migration tending towards prosperous centres, wealthy regions, and developed states. This movement will continue rather than slow or stop due to the accentuation of political, economic, and demographic disparities between sending and receiving states. At the same time, migration between impoverished states is expected to grow due to the tremendous instability and insecurity of underdeveloped regions.



According to a 1999 estimation of the United Nations, 3% of the world's population lives in a country other than that of its birth. Therefore, if the global population according to the latest tally is 6.4 billion, the world's migrant population today is approximately 193 million. Migration in this crowded world of globalisation is characterised by a rise in the number of receiver and sending states and the appearance of a curious category known as transit states. If it is more than a century now since the large European migrations to the Americas occurred, roughly from the years 1840 to 1914, from a handful of European countries (principally Great Britain, Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, Italy, and Spain) to a handful of American ones (above all the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina), today sending states are dispersed throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and receptor states can be found as much in North America, Europe, and Australasia as the Persian Gulf and the developed areas of Asia. In the number of sender states, receptor states, transit states, and those that are a hybrid of these, and in terms of the intricate routes migrants have laid and the experiences they have borne, migration has become highly complex. The result, Joaquín Arango affirms, "is a multi-polar and global system" (2005:23).


What has changed is that whereas in decades past migrants were actively sought by receiving states today the majority of migrants are neither sponsored nor welcomed, but migrate in spite of borders and barriers. According to Arango, "freedom of mobility is the exception, regulation and restriction is the norm" (2005:23). This lack of free movement has made it so that a number of notable pre-First World War phenomena are no longer observable, for example, the seasonal labour migrations of Italians between Europe and the New World, the famous *golondrini* (swallows) (Nugent, 1989). Even countries with developed economies and low demographic indices who have continued to accept annual quotas of immigrants following long traditions, such as Canada, the United States, and Australia, have toughened entry requirements and defended a fierce policy of immigrant "selection" since the 1973 Oil Crisis.¹

Yet in spite of borders, migration has become a reality in today's world. Growth in overall demographic disequilibrium between developed and underdeveloped states, even though birth rates have reduced in certain senders such as Morocco and Turkey, has persisted or even widened. Socio-economic and political differences have also grown.²

■ ¹ In 2004, Canada scheduled to accept between 220,000 and 245,000 permanent new residents (between immigrants and refugees) and accepted 235,824 (<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/facts2004/overview/index.html>); in 2004-05, Australia planned to accept between 105,000 and 120,000 immigrants and 13,000 refugees (<http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/20planning.htm>); in 2004, the United States accepted 10,613 refugees and naturalised 536,174 persons (<http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/mrsrsep04/natz.htm>).

² For example, the 2005 birth rate for Spain is 1.28, while for Morocco it is 2.73, and for Mauritania 5.94. Source: *The World Factbook* (<http://cia.gov/>

<http://cia.gov/publications/factbook/>). Regarding political and economic disequilibrium, Spain is a constitutional monarchy with a GDP per capita of \$23,300 and an unemployment rate of 10.4% (data for 2004); Morocco is also a constitutional monarchy in which the figure of the king is more than symbolic, with a GDP per capita of \$4,200, and an unemployment rate of 12.1%, with 19% of the population below the poverty line (data estimated for 2004); Mauritania is a republic that follows Islamic Sharia law, with a GDP per capita of \$1,800, 20% unemployment, and 40% below the poverty line (data estimated for 2004). Source: *The World Factbook* (<http://cia.gov/cia/>



Moreover, after more than 30 years of International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Policies, inability of the World Bank to reduce or eradicate foreign debts of developing countries, recurrence of epidemics of curable diseases in Africa, and ongoing deficit of food security brought about by crises in subsistence farming and barriers to the access of food in environmentally volatile lands, we must conclude that mainstream development models not only encourage migration but are bankrupt as viable solutions. The 1999 dollarisation of Ecuador's economy and the 2001 Argentine crisis prove that economic ups and downs can trigger the removal of hundreds of thousands of persons, after they watch their work, savings, security, and possibility to educate their children vanish. And when the trigger is not economic, conflict for political, religious, or social reasons seems to achieve the same ends of population displacement, as has occurred in the Horn of Africa, the triad of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Ivory Coast, in southern Sudan, and is in play at the moment in the Darfur region. Thus, the failure of development, economic crisis and political instability, armed conflict and repeated violation of human rights, which show no signs of abating in the twenty-first century, are the predominant driving factors behind millions of migrations.


THE FAILURE OF MIGRATION POLICIES

Erosion of the distinctions between different types of migration, together with the sheer size of the global phenomenon, promotes failure in the migration policy of receiving states.

Since the Second World War, western states have organised migration policies around national interest as defined by the parties of elected governments and an international consensus that gives some consideration to forced migration.³ Economic factors seem to be the main determinants of this policy, but cultural and historical factors such as preference with regard to migrants' ethnic origins and states' relations to former colonies, have also played an important role.

A good example of the way in which economic factors have conditioned migration policies is the way in which northern European countries reacted to the 1973 Oil Crisis. From a general open-doors policy in which immigrants from the south, including from Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal as well as

■ ³ The appearance of the status of refugee in 1951 at the Rome Convention and the approval of the 1967 Protocol are the most relevant factors in defining the international consensus.



Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey, among others, were welcomed as workers (*Gastarbeiter*), with the understanding they would return once infrastructure and key industries were rebuilt in the north, northern European countries introduced a policy of zero or no immigration. This occurred once immigrants' work had been made redundant by economic crisis. However, in the years 1945 to 1973 these immigrant workers had adapted to their new societies. They had brought their families, learned a new language, and made a living for themselves; so much so, that although they had gone from invitees to unwelcome residents, they refused to leave. Similarly, cultural factors explain why in countries like Germany, where Turks have resided for decades, or in France, where Algerians have done the same, governments and a large portion of the population have refused to accept that immigrants have arrived to stay. And as a result, they have done little to integrate immigrants in the school system and social services, to consider them in urban planning, etc.

“Zero immigration policy has had disastrous consequences on social cohesion”

The policy of zero immigration has had disastrous consequences on social cohesion because governments have planned with the assumption that immigrants are not going to arrive forever in a steady stream. This has left a very vulnerable segment of society in paralegal limbo in those northern countries. Also, it has blurred the line separating the different categories of immigrant. Since economic migration to Europe has been made virtually impossible, the only way in is to apply for refugee status (political asylum), to apply through family reunification, or to attempt entry in an illegal manner.

First, with regard to the line separating categories of immigrants, the number of economic migrants that solicit refugee status has increased notably. This has promoted deception in the system of refugee protection and has had the secondary effect of reducing the percentage of accepted refugees and denying protection to numerous others (Harvey, 2000; Richmond, 2001).⁴ Second, in addition to the already existing confusion between economic migrants and refugees, the same antiquated concept of refugee has been maintained due to a lack of will amongst receptor states that do not want international responsibilities to force them into accepting a greater number of refugees. Also, the United Nations has been unable to expand the definition of refugee because of pressure from countries like Australia, who refuse to accept the notion of “environmental refugee”⁵. Third, the stereotype of the immigrant as a lone male in search of work

■ ⁴ The international consensus accepts that people only merit refugee status if they have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion, race, nationality, religion, or belonging to a particular social group. See the 1951 Rome Convention at http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm and the 1967 Protocol at http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_p_ref.htm.

⁵ See Humphrey M., “Refugees: An Endangered Species?”, *Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 39, No. 1, (March,

2003): 31-43 for Australia’s policies towards refugees, Bates, D.C., “Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change”, *Population and Environment*, Vol. 23, No. 5, (May, 2002): 465-477 for the concept of environmental refugee and Kelley, N., “The Convention Refugee Definition and Gender-Based Persecution: A Decade’s Progress”, *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol. 13, No. 4, (2001): 559-568 for how the Convention’s definition of refugee has changed to include sexual persecution.

has changed to incorporate other images. Today, women are the majority of emigrants in some countries, such as the Philippines, while unaccompanied minors are growing in numbers elsewhere⁶.

The problem is the plurality and confusion of categories does not fit the tight policies of receptor countries, who either continue to pretend that zero immigration is feasible or accept that there is economic necessity for cheap labour in certain sectors such as agriculture, domestic services, and tourism. In the latter scenario, receptor countries either tend to opt for a selective immigration policy or continue to fool themselves into thinking that temporary immigration *à la Gastarbeiter* is workable. However, due to the impossibility of fully defending land borders, such as the massive 3,141-kilometre border between the United States and Mexico, as well as sea borders, such as the treacherous stretches between Tunisia and Italy, Morocco and Spain, and even Australia and Asia, it is likely that developed states will increasingly adopt selective immigration policies complemented by infrequent amnesties and regularisations. And the better the selective policy works, the more the political class and other sectors of the population will resist the granting of amnesties to irregular immigrants. This is occurring at the moment in the United States and Canada, where notwithstanding reluctance members of the population, the governments are contemplating partial amnesties. In the case of Canada, the government is deliberating on an amnesty for construction workers alone.⁷

THE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTION?

Developed states see development of sending states as an important solution to migration. But they want immigrants to do this development for them. Otherwise, underdeveloped neighbouring states can deal with the problem by absorbing and preventing migrants in an earliest possible stage of transit.

Most developed states, and in Europe in particular, agree to two things: one, the development of sending states will reduce emigrant numbers; and two, this development will be very expensive and therefore it would be better left to others. Mechanisms created by the United Nations after decolonisation have not achieved their intended goals. Hypocritical attitudes of developed countries who have affirmed a desire to aid poor nations while simultaneously promoting their underdevelopment through unilateral trade mechanisms are to blame for the lack of real development. Nevertheless, the rhetoric and institutionalisation of development continue unabated as though reality told a different story, through agencies like the United Nations Development Programme and the otherwise very legitimate and noble idea that development for the poor is necessary and achievable.

Needless to say, the context today is not what it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Developed states are cutting rather than increasing funds they once allotted to development and

■ ⁶ See Bell, M., "Integration: Refugee Children in Britain and Europe" *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4, (2005): 105-108.

⁷ See "Ottawa pledges to target backlog of 700,000", *The Globe and Mail*, October 31, 2005, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/rtgam.20051031.wximmigrants1031/bnstory/national> and Sammon, B., "Bush revives bid to legalize illegal aliens", *The Washington Times*, November 10, 2004, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20041110-123424-5467r.htm>

[theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/rtgam.20051031.wximmigrants1031/bnstory/national](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/rtgam.20051031.wximmigrants1031/bnstory/national) and Sammon, B., "Bush revives bid to legalize illegal aliens", *The Washington Times*, November 10, 2004, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20041110-123424-5467r.htm>

they are unwilling to forgive the crushing foreign debts of countries in meaningful ways that are more than symbolic.⁸ These cuts, combined with millions of emigrants resident and working in wealthy countries who send remittances to their families abroad, are generating a new neoliberal ideology of development. In this model, developed states may legitimately reduce funds earmarked for development because immigrants already send copious amounts abroad.⁹ That is, no more is required for development than the proper channelling and utilisation of immigrants' private wealth. And sending states can achieve that with a measure like the imposition of a tax on remittances sent from abroad. Accordingly, development has become a private affair in which developed states not only play a passive role but see themselves as paying a fair share just by allowing immigrants to send money to their countries of origin.


“Plurality and confusion of categories does not fit the tight policies of receptor countries”

And as this model takes more definitive shape, receptor states are beginning to pressure sending states and their neighbours to absorb migrants and nip the problem in the bud. In exchange for this policing, developed states offer trade incentives and foreign aid. An example is the agreement between the United States and Mexico to prevent Central American migrants from reaching the United States via Mexico, which have turned the already corrupt Mexican police into the chief obstacle to overcome in order to realise a share of the “American Dream”. Another example is the agreement between Morocco and the European Union, which accomplishes the same prophylactic ends by encouraging Moroccan authorities to police the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and exits to the Straights of Gibraltar and Canary Islands, at a price of great human-rights violations. Sub-Saharan migrants en route to Europe have been left stranded in the middle of the Sahara by Moroccan authorities as a result of this very serious game.¹⁰

■ ⁸ See Cooper, M.H., “Reassessing foreign aid: should the U.S. keep cutting back on aid?”, *CQ Researcher*, Vol. 6 (September 27 1996): 843-863 and Roodman, D.M., “Still waiting for the Jubilee: pragmatic solutions for the Third World debt crisis”, Worldwatch Institute, 2001.

⁹ See Libercier, M.H. and Schneider, H. “Migrants: partners in development co-operation,” Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996 and Settimo, R., “Workers’ remittance to Mediterranean countries: a potentially important tool for economic development”, *Economia Internazionale/International Economics*, Vol. 58, No. 1, (February 2005): 51-77.

¹⁰ See, for instance, the report of Amnesty International “Spain and Morocco. Failure to protect the rights of migrants, Ceuta and Melilla one year on” (<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR410092006>) and the report of Human Rights Watch “United States, Crossing the Line. Human Rights Abuses Along the U. S. Border with Mexico Persist Amid Climate of Impunity” (<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Us1.htm>)



IMMIGRATION AS A SECURITY MATTER


The growing view that immigration is a security problem jeopardises the human rights of immigrants and the legal guarantees of democratic societies. It also lowers states' compliance to their international responsibilities and obligations.

Europe has become a fortress defended by the *Mare Nostrum*. However, each day, more and more, territories close to or within Africa such as Ceuta and Melilla, the Canary Islands, Lampedusa Island, etc., cannot be protected from the human deluge stemming from more populous and impoverished surrounding territory. The United States is a sieve that strains thousands of immigrants through the Rio Grande, and Australia, in theory the most sheltered land mass, requires a vast coastguard system to divert refugee vessels on an ongoing basis. Obsession with stopping human movement originates in the inability or unwillingness of international organizations and the most powerful states to distribute global resources in an equitable fashion, as well as in a refusal to receive humans fleeing from situations of provoked misery.

Since 9/11 and subsequent attacks on Indonesia, Madrid, and London, Islamic terrorism has become the official nemesis of the twenty-first century. It has replaced the communist menace of previous decades. Initially, as a result of the attacks on New York and Madrid, the stereotype of the terrorist was one of an Arab immigrant, in one case from Saudi Arabia and in the other case from Morocco. In the West, the perception of the delinquent immigrant has changed to become that of the terrorist immigrant, or more precisely the potentially terrorist Muslim immigrant, a much more dangerous epithet. This perception has been fuelled by the politics of George W. Bush,

Couple, Artur Heras (2005)
acrylic on canvas
230 x 280 cm





Tony Blair, and former Spanish president José María Aznar, as well as by an “embedded” and uncritical press. But the equation changed with the London attack. The terrorists were British nationals, children of immigrants of old colonies, not immigrants born abroad. Parallels were drawn more starkly between the old communists and the new Islamic terrorists, both Fifth Columns in the service of foreign powers pretending to achieve the total destruction of western civilization and democracy.

The new “crusade” has a foreign and domestic component. In the eyes of wealthy states, the solution to the foreign component is to control and filter migration flows, particularly those utilising irregular channels. Designed to protect populations targeted by terrorists,

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measures to control irregular flows have provoked a lack of protection for legitimate refugees who utilise the same channels. But refugees use these irregular channels because they have no choice; in order to request asylum, they have to be in the territory of the state in which they ask for the asylum (Whitacker, 1998). Meanwhile, these measures have not succeeded in avoiding

the traffic of persons, forced prostitution, sweatshop work, mafias, and the risk of further terrorist attack. The solution to the domestic component is not as clear. Collective internment of peoples deemed “enemy aliens”, “Fifth Columnists”, or “sleeper cells” has not yet been proposed as during the First and Second World Wars in England, Canada, and the United States, but measures to facilitate the internment of suspect individuals have been instituted. Extraordinary measures have been implemented to undermine the rights of individuals, including representation of a lawyer, to know the charges of an accusation, to receive visitors, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, etc. These measures have also weakened the rule of law through use of secret trials, extra-territorial imprisonment, detention without charge for indefinite amounts of time, and so on. And they have enfeebled international legislation on human rights and international humanitarian law enshrined in the Geneva Conventions and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.¹¹

Subterfuges the United States and Great Britain have found to jump domestic and international legislation on human rights have been extremely creative. “Extraordinary rendition”, a good example, is the deportation of terrorist suspects to select countries, sometimes their countries of origin, where they are interrogated in ways that amount to torture, which would be unacceptable in western states.¹²

■ ¹¹ See, for example, the 2001 USA PATRIOT LAW and the 2005 USA PATRIOT ACT IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT at US Department of Justice’s website (<http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/index.html>).

¹² One of the most flagrant examples is the case of Maher Arar, a Syrian-born Canadian who was sent to

a Syrian prison while on transit through the United States, where from September 2002 to October 2003 he was tortured. In 2006, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner apologised for the misdeed. See <http://www.maherarar.ca>.

MODELS IN CRISIS AND ALTERNATIVES

British multiculturalism, the American melting pot, and French assimilation are under scrutiny, while alternatives in other countries are not readily found. Meanwhile, racial discrimination in wealthy countries due to ideological and identity factors, as well as socioeconomic change, is on the rise. A change of mentality following the “Alliance of Civilizations” and a modified social contract are needed to maintain a sense of cooperation based on respect and equality.

If anyone doubted French and British models of cultural integration were in crisis, the June 2005 attack on London and the November 2005 riots in France changed their minds. But are there alternatives? Of the existing models, those of Great Britain, Australia, Holland, France, and the United States have been most strongly discredited by analysts for the geographical segregation and social discrimination they seem to generate. Canada has succeeded so far to maintain a certain social cohesion. This is due to the positive attitude of the Canadian political class, society-wide awareness of being a country formed by immigration, and widespread provision of economic means to facilitate the integration of immigrants. But for many European countries, Canada cannot be an example of exportable policy. According to many Europeans, the experience of a new country of immigration is not the same as the experience of a country that has been formed by centuries of history without immigration, as is the case with most European countries. At the same time, we need to ask ourselves: has Europe really been immigration-free in the last two centuries? Even in earlier centuries? Has it not been mixed up and renewed by past fluxes of people? And today, is there a single European country that does not have immigrants and thus cannot be called a country of immigration?

The reality is that there is no magic potion to deal with cultural diversity. Only a clear awareness of the question and a desire on the part of administrations and organizations to work as they were intended, according to their principles, including the media, can create a new model of interculturalism rather than multiculturalism, in which interrelation rather than segregation is valued and both receiving societies and newly arrived persons can work to create new and dynamic spaces. However, changes of this scale require consensus that does not seem to exist in the majority of receiving states where immigration has become a political weapon in the hands of conservative and extreme-right parties. Through the use of deep-seated fears such as loss of economic and social privilege, loss of security and even of life itself, in the way Bush, Blair, Chirac, Howard, Berlusconi, and others have done, means have been constructed to shift the balance of liberty and security in favour of security, in detriment to the democratic guarantees and wellbeing of minority groups.

Still, the domestic cultural diversity of developed states is not going to go away, even though immigrants feel increasingly uneasy about changing policy and social perceptions. For example, two-thirds of British immigrants of Southeast Asian descent stated they would consider leaving the United Kingdom due to Islamophobia after the London attack.¹³ The presence of new cultural minorities in developed states —called diasporas or transnational communities— is an irreversible phenomenon that many regard as a destructive questioning of traditional national identity, including the identities of

national minorities. An improved social contract that takes into consideration the initiative of current Spanish president José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Alliance of Civilisations, might reap positive rewards. Debate as to the characteristics of this strengthened contract remain to be seen, but the hope is that we will extend and entrench our rights and freedoms with this discussion.

EROSION OF CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship continues to be the foundation upon which rights and responsibilities are attributed to residents. However, the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is being eroded by the appearance of new intermediate figures, such as the non-citizen that enjoys limited political rights, the citizen that is socially discriminated, and the resident non-citizen that has no rights whatsoever.

Currently, states classify inhabitants according to their status —or lack thereof— as citizens. Citizenship is the main institution that grants and guarantees individual rights to members of a country, whether democratic or authoritarian. This state of affairs has not arisen overnight but developed in conjunction with the fight for equality between men of differing social standing and property ownership, between men of differing races and ethnicities, between men and women, and so on. The existence of differing degrees of citizenship has been the norm for most of the history of the institution of citizenship. Equality of citizens' rights and responsibilities is a recent and incomplete phenomenon. The right to same-sex marriage, for instance, continues to be questioned. Equal citizenship is an ideal to which democratic societies aspire, and foreigners represent a challenge to the institution because they rupture the dichotomy of citizen/non-citizen.

The idea that all residents are citizens and enjoy every right and share every responsibility excludes non-citizens. In a world in which borders are shut and therefore limited possibilities exist for legal migration, the reality is most immigrants arrive and remain illegally. In other words, they have no rights and no responsibilities. Immigrants and refugees in states which accept an annual quota arrive with the legal right to reside and work, but not to citizenship. In states that do not accept immigrants legally, many immigrants in irregular situations could achieve legal residence and employment by an amnesty or regularisation, which is the most common mechanism for states of the northern Mediterranean. A significant percentage of the population in most western states resides legally but does not have citizenship, which entails different implications depending on the particular state in question. In Canada, for example, the difference between "citizen" and "resident" is entirely a political issue: non-citizens do not have the right to vote nor to present themselves as candidates for election, but naturalisation in turn is very accessible. The country requires three years of residency and basic linguistic and political knowledge. In other countries, residency is not permanent. It has to be renewed every year or every five years, while access to citizenship is much longer and

■ ¹³ See *The Guardian*, "Muslims Poll," July 2005, <http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2005/Guardian%20-%20muslims%20july05/Guardian%20Muslims%20julo5.asp>

¹⁴ See October 8 Law 36/2002, which modifies the Civil Code regarding nationality, and the Spanish Civil Code, which requires 10 years of residency for most foreigners in order to acquire citizenship.

complicated.¹⁴ But whether by personal choice or lack of it —because dual nationality is not accepted or because persons become *denizens* when nationality is based on *ius sanguini* and they cannot access it (Hammar, 1992)— a good part of the population and a growing segment is resident without citizenship. This population is disconnected from the political realm yet suffers the electoral choices of its citizens. Something is wrong when an Italian citizen through family connections but Canadian by birth and resident in Canada can exercise more political influence in Italy than Tunisian or French citizens resident there, where they work and educate their family.

In addition to the growing number of legal residents without political rights, an increasing percentage of naturalised citizens are categorised as second-class for religious, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or racial differences. When for historic or political reasons, a democratic state gives preference to one religion over another, or when public administrations are powerless (or do not exercise their power for electoral reasons) to guarantee normalcy for everyone in the practice of religion, especially to those of the Islamic faith, social rights and responsibilities are not the same even though we cannot in a technical and legal sense speak of second-class citizenship. Further, in cases where there is not religious discrimination, there may be socio-economic discrimination, which may be why French citizens of Maghrebi origin have been relegated to suburban ghettos for decades but not excluded from a secular schooling system and civil bureaucracy.

Because of security concerns, democratic states such as Canada and England —where it is only permanent residents that are obliged to carry identification documents— have begun to withdraw the status of permanent from residents with alleged connections to terrorism and deport them to their countries of origin, although they have not reached the point of legislating reversible naturalisation for these persons. The introduction of security in the debate over citizenship, permanent residency without citizenship, and non-citizenship status, has returned talk to the old dichotomy of citizen/non-citizen, which leaves persons in intermediate situations in legal limbo. At the same time, alternatives are not easily found. Numerous voices propose to link citizenship to stable residence in municipalities, a concept known as “citizenship as neighbourhood” (De Lucas, 2005). This new idea would allow persons to root themselves in their more immediate contexts and to facilitate the enjoyment of rights and the sharing of responsibilities.

The landscape this article presents is hardly optimistic, but it would be erroneous to transmit a vision of helplessness. After all, as the poet Miquel Martí i Pol states in a poem called *Ara mateix* (Right Now), “everything thing needs to be done, everything is possible” ||

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